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ABSTRACT
Online reservation systems have grown over the last recent
years to facilitate the purchase of goods and services. Gen-
erally, reservation systems require that customers provide
some personal data to make a reservation effective. With
this data, service providers can check the consumer history
and decide if the user is trustable enough to get the reserve.
Although the reputation of a user is a good metric to im-
plement the access control of the system, providing personal
and sensitive data to the system presents high privacy risks,
since the interests of a user are totally known and tracked
by an external entity. In this paper we design an anony-
mous reservation protocol that uses reputations to profile
the users and control their access to the offered services, but
at the same time it preserves their privacy not only from the
seller but the service provider.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is becoming increasingly important with the dawn
of the Internet. The advent of new applications and services
that require users to divulge many personal details about
themselves, is a privacy thread that must be carefully stud-
ied. The practice of surveillance is increasingly being used
by the private sector with the aim of data profiling the enti-
ties and individuals, and getting information (e.g. strengths,
weaknesses) of the people they have to deal with. Citizens
may be concerned that they are constantly being watched,
and that their personal details and situation can get in the
wrong hands and be exploited by unwanted or even criminal
people.
One of the Internet activities that is more vulnerable to
privacy attacks is the e-commerce. Vendors are interested
in profiling the preferences of consumers because they can
infer the maximum price each user is willing to pay for a
good or services and so, set the prices accordingly and obtain
the maximum benefit possible. Of course the profiling can
also be interesting from the point of view of the consumers
when they get personalized offers and recommendations, but
it should be in the consumers’ control to decide when they
want to be profiled or when not.
Among e-commerce architectures, we focus our work in busi-
ness to consumer (B2C) platforms for small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). In SMEs, e-commerce is promoted as
a mean to improve competitiveness. However, a full im-
plementation of an e-commerce site requires an important
financial investment that most SMEs can not afford, and
poor maintained sites are prone to provide a bad impression
to the customer and so be counter-productive. Thus, the
winning e-commerce platform among SMEs is structured in
two sides with intermediaries in the middle. On one side of
the business are vendors that want to reach consumers. On
the other side are potential consumers who may or may not
be interested in purchasing the offered items and receiving
advertising messages. In between there are intermediaries
that operate portals to facilitate the connection of vendors
and consumers.
Intermediary web portals or business brokers, are key players
in the achievement of a purchase agreement. Customers use
the platform to compare the offers of different vendors and
finally select the goods or services they want to purchase.
The broker can get a lot of information from this browsing,
analysis, selection, and purchase. Note that a user can be
profiled even if she does not transmit personal information
with the portal. Only with her attributes (pseudonym, mail,
IP address, ..) the vendor can be able to recognize her.
One of the critical factors for the success of an e-commerce
web portal is its capacity to induce confidence among con-
sumers. In [18], Kim et al. study the roles of trust and risk in
an e-commerce decision and which are the elements to build
these roles. Their results show that both privacy and secu-
rity policies have very strong effects on customers’ trust in
a website, and that the willingness to make a transaction is
inversely proportional to the involved perceived risk. More-
over, the presence of a third-party seal does not increase
the consumers’ trust, although it can help by reducing the
perceived risk of a purchase.
B2C portals can integrate reservation and purchasing facili-
ties. On the one hand, portals that offer buying and paying
for a good are more complex to deploy since there is a fi-
nancial risk and both consumers and vendors must trust the
system. Well designed protocols such as Secure Electronic
Transaction (SET) [23] have been proposed, but they have
not become widely used due the companies uncertainties to
invest in a complex technology that can be difficult to un-
derstand and trust from customers, and the implementation
cost and overhead associated with it. On the other hand,
portals that only provide booking facilities are easier to de-
ploy, and so more extended. However, they also suffer se-
curity risks that often have not been appropriately treated.
These risks mainly include non-repudiation actions for the
vendor and the customer, and privacy issues.
Thus, the propose of this paper is the development of an
easy to deploy e-commerce B2C platform suitable for SME,
that minimizes the perceived risks of the customers, and
that provides effective trust mechanisms. Since the online
payment systems are the elements of e-commerce platforms
that users are more reluctant to, we design a reservation sys-
tem that do not requires monetary payments. We present
a novel platform, the AMNESIC -AnonyMous reputatioN
basEd reServatIons in e-Commerce- that provides access to
advertisements, getting information about a product, read-
ing experts and customer’s reviews, and reserving a service,
preserving the privacy of the consumers. AMNESIC does
not require to introduce new agents in actual e-commerce
platforms based on a broker, and proposes a protocol that
is simple as well as secure.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews literatures related to privacy protecting e-
commerce schemes. Section 3 presents the architecture of
our framework, whereas the details of the processes involved
in the scheme are illustrated in Section 4. Section 5 eval-
uates the proposed reservation scheme through three view-
points: costumer, broker, and vendor. Finally, conclusions
and further work are given in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
Anonymity and reputation seems to be obviously contra-
dictory requirements since reputation systems need some
sort of accountability to discern whether users behave in
an appropriate way or not. Several papers (eg. [5, 15, 2])
identify the problems associated with technologies offering
anonymity and accountability, and agree that there must be
a balance between these two properties and that a proper
anonymous scheme should not reveal the identity of honest
users but should track the identity of dishonest ones.
Different approaches to deal with anonymity and account-
ability have been proposed. The direct anonymous attesta-
tion scheme (DAA) [4] permits the authentication of a user
through a special hardware module, called Trusted Platform
Module (TPM)[19], that provides a secure environment ca-
pable of storing secret information, generating cryptographic
keys, and implementing cryptographic functions such as en-
cryption and digital signatures. At the same time, it pre-
serves the privacy of the user that owns the module. Solu-
tions based on DAA can be used for e-commerce applica-
tions, but they have the drawback of requiring that clients
hold a particular hardware module.
Some works propose building an infrastructure that can is-
sue anonymous accountable tickets [11, 13]. Although effec-
tive, these solutions are complex since several parties and
transactions are required in order to get the elements to
carry out an e-commerce operation. For example, in [13]
users need to hold at least two real identity certificates is-
sued from separate Certification Authorities in order to op-
erate in the system. Moreover, the generation of an anony-
mous ticket to make an e-commerce transaction, involves a
trusted party that is the responsible to generate the ticket,
the above-mentioned CAs, and a trusted Legal Authority
that will trace the anonymous ticket to its corresponding
real-identity certificate if the user misbehaves.
Other proposals treat the problem of doing an e-commerce
transaction with an anonymous e-cash protocol. The aim is
that a user is able to buy goods on-line and that nor the
vendor knows who is the consumer, nor the bank knows the
items that a user has bought. The solutions usually involve
a third party that is involved in the purchase process in or-
der to help the consumer to get the required anonymity [25],
or, in some more efficient schemes [7, 20], it helps the sys-
tem to trace users operations when a bank wants to identify
a dishonest consumer. Canard and Gouget propose in [8]
a construction that does not require a trusted third party.
However the complexity and computations of the protocol
are notable, and quite superior than the ones of schemes
that deal with a trusted third party.
The closest related works to our proposal are the designs
of [17, 26, 3], which define general frameworks to ensure
accountability in reputation systems while maintaining ano-
nymity. For example, Buttyan et al. [6] present an architec-
ture based on the existence of a customer care agency that
is fully trusted by both client and service provider, and de-
sign a ticket-based system that allows anonymous accesses
to the services. However, like most of the payment system
proposals [24], this solution suffers the problems of including
a trusted third party in the system.
The proposals that do not require a trusted third party
are based on the collaboration of different users/entities of
the system. For example, the Accountable Self-Organizing
Communities (A2SOCs) scheme proposed in [17] generates
on time identities for the users of the e-commerce system,
and the association between the real identity of the users
and their virtual one is hidden using public cryptography.
To disclose this association a master key is required, and
this key is distributed among the members of the network
using threshold cryptography. Therefore, the collaboration
of several members of the community is required to trace a
user.
The A2SOC proposal is extended in [26], where the authors
design a layered architecture to reduce the possible exposure
of users’ private information while enforcing accountability.
Besides, [3] proposes a system in which users requests the
authorization access to an e-commerce platform using a one
time identifier supported by some attribute credentials from
external referees. External referees may request to know the
identity of the user to issue a positive credential, but do not
know which is the purpose and the destination of this.
3. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
The research case of our designed B2C platform, examines
a scenario where a number of consumers intend to make
a reservation of a good or service through an e-commerce
portal in the Internet. Users get the reserved item by a face
encounter with the vendor, and in that moment they make
the payment of it. The system can be used for getting tickets
for some performances (theatre, sports, concerts, ..), making
reservations in hotels and restaurants, getting appointments
in a medical centre, or reserving a good in a shop.
The scheme involves three participants: the Broker (B), the
Vendor (V ), and the Customer (C). Besides, a Certification
Authority (CA) is assumed to issue identity certificates for
the involved parties in order to participate in the scheme.
Figure 1 depicts a general overview of the architecture of the
system.
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Figure 1: System Architecture
The communication between the customer and the broker
is over an SSL server authentication session. The broker
and the vendor use a mutual authentication SSL channel to
communicate with. And finally, the data interchange be-
tween the customer and the vendor must be granted that it
can be provided without technological means, using a phys-
ical channel. This limitation assures that the system can be
deployed easily and without a great inversion to any run-
ning company, and that it can reach all the customers that
already use the Internet to find and compare goods and ser-
vices. Regardless of this condition, the communication be-
tween the customer and the vendor can also be automatized
using a wireless personal area network, like Bluetooth.
For illustrative purposes, we will take the particular case of
making a reservation in a restaurant to explain the system
architecture and the processes involved in it. From the point
of view of the reservation portal, it can no longer track the
users; However, since users have to return to the web site
after the reservation is executed in a restaurant, the portal
can take profit of this to obtain more feedback from its ser-
vices and that of the restaurants. Thus, the information of
the portal can be improved, being more accurate,
The role of the system participants’ is the following:
1. Certification Authorities: the system is supported by
one or more external and trustworthy PKIs.
2. Broker: web portal that advertises and classifies the
restaurants. It maintains a ranking of the restaurants
based on customers’ opinions. It also holds reviews.
3. Vendors: restaurants.
4. Customers: people that have registered in the web por-
tal and are potential customers of the restaurants.
The system let users reserve a restaurant from the web portal
without paying any fee. However, users have an associated
reputation and restaurants may state that people whose rep-
utation is below a certain threshold cannot reserve a table
in their premises. If the reservation request of a user is ac-
cepted, she gets her reputation decreased in one point and
in exchange, she receives a reservation code (named rcode).
When the user executes the reservation, she goes to the so-
licited restaurant and presents the reservation code rcode.
The restaurant checks if it has a reservation identified with
this number, and if it does, it offers a table to the consumer
and gives her a validation code (named vcode).
Afterwards, the customer can enter the received vcode in
the web portal and recover the reputation point she had
used to pay for the reservation. Moreover, if she gives feed-
back of the experience in the restaurant, she gains another
extra point that increases her reputation. Contrary, if the
customer does not introduce the vcode in the application, it
is assumed that she did not fulfil her obligations with the
restaurant and so, she can not reclaim her spent reputation
point.
Therefore, the system works such that users do not have
to pay money to make a reservation, but they have an as-
sociated reputation (which is measured with points) that
expresses if they finally meet their reserves or not. This
reputation is the metric used to evaluate whether to allow
users to make new reservations when they demand it to.
Besides, the restaurants also have a reputation from the eval-
uations that former customers have reported of their service.
This reputation is public for all system users’ so that they
can use it to decide if they want to reserve a table in a
particular restaurant or not.
The security properties of the system guarantee the right
execution of the protocols involved in the reservation and
the privacy protection of the customers that participate in
it. In particular, the aimed properties of the system are the
following.
1. From the customer’s point of view:
• No one (neither the broker nor the vendor) know
the identity or the user profile of the customer
who is making a reservation.
• No one but the customer herself is able to make
a reservation using her own reputation.
• Only the customer specified in the reservation (or
someone in whom she trusts and delegates) can
receive the good or service she has reserved.
• Only the proper customer can recover the funds
she has deposited to make a reservation.
• The customer can be certain of being correctly
credited for the reservations and deals with the
vendors.
2. From the broker’s point of view:
• The broker can detect a fraudulent use of a cus-
tomer’s deposit.
3. From the vendor’s point of view:
• The vendor cannot deny that a customer has com-
pleted the deal agreed in a reservation.
4. PROTOCOL
The main characteristic of the AMNESIC system is that
provides anonymity. To this end, we use partially blind sig-
natures. Blind signatures were first introduced by Chaum
[10] and satisfy the unforgeability (only the signer is able
to generate valid signatures) and unlinkability (no one can
derive the association between the message and the blind
signature, except the signature requester) properties. Par-
tially blind signatures, introduced later by Abe and Fujisaki
[1], allow that moreover a signer can include some piece of
information to the signed data, under an agreement with the
signature requester.
However, Coron et al. [12] found both Chaum and Abe-
Fujisaki algorithms presented the problem of being vulner-
able to chosen-plaintext attacks. Fan et al. [16] proposed
a randomization technique to withstand the attack on blind
signatures. Using randomization the message to be signed is
determined by both of the signature requester and the signer
and so, the attackers cannot obtain the signature of an ar-
bitrarily chosen message. Cao et al. [9] proposed a random-
ized RSA-based partially blind signature which meets the
unforgeability and unlinkability properties. Our reservation
scheme is based on the Cao et al. algorithm.
The functionalities provided by the scheme are classified in
six distinct actions: (1) the registry in which a customer first
enters in the web Portal, (2) the reservation phase in which
a customer books a service in the web Portal for a specific
vendor, (3) the cancellation, that is produced when a cus-
tomer wants to vacate a reservation, (4) the service phase,
in which the customer gets the service she had reserved and
pays for it, (5) the deposit phase where the reputation of the
customer and vendor is updated, and (6) the renewal phase
in which the customer updates her pseudonymous before it
expires.
Details of the six actions of the scheme are shown in the
following. First, we introduce in table 1 the notations we
use.
It is assumed that the potential customers of the scheme, the
vendors, and the broker, possess an RSA digital certificate
issued by a trusted CA. The public key of the broker satisfies
2d+1 < pbkb, with d the length of the hash function h used
in the reservation protocol.
4.1 Registry
At the start of the protocol a user U registers herself in the
restaurants’ web portal (managed by a broker B) sending
her identity certificate certu.
uid The identity of a customer U
bid The identity of a broker B
vid The identity of a vendor V
psd The temporal pseudonymous of customer U -
psd(t) is the authentication pseudonymous in
time t-
pvkk, pbkk The private and public key of entity K
nk Working modulus of the pair key of entity K
certk A digital certificate of the entity K signed by a
TTP
rep The reputation account of a customer U
exp The expiration date of temporal pseudonymous
and its associated reputation
h(·) one-way hash function
d the length of the one-way hash function output
w The wallet of a customer U
db The data base of a broker B
rcode A reservation code of a vendor
vcode A validation code of a vendor
dbU Web portal database with information of regis-
tered users and their initial reputation
dbR Web portal database with information about
the unexpired reservations requested by its cus-
tomers, and the pseudonymous used for it.
log Web portal database with a list of already used
but unexpired pseudonymous
dbV Vendor database with information about the
pending reserves
Z∗nk Set of all positive integers less than and relative
prime to nk
| concatenation function
Table 1: Notation
On receipt of the first message, the broker B verifies the
certificate certu and if it is correct, it sends to U an integer
y = xpbkb (mod nb), with x ∈ Z
∗
nb
a random number, and
pbkb its public key. The integer y plays two roles in this
context: (1) the signer’s commitment to the randomizing
factor x, and (2) a challenge for checking that the customer
owns the declared private key.
User U demonstrates knowledge of her private key pvku by
computing a signature over the received challenge y, which
she then sends to B together with a message np (next-
pseudonymous) . To build np, the customer first gener-
ates a random sequence of bytes, psd, that constitutes the
pseudonymous she will use to authenticate herself to the
broker the next time she gets a session. Then, she generates
two random numbers: (1) a randomizing factor v ∈ Z∗nb , (2)
a blinding factor r ∈ Z∗nb . She computes the message np
doing
np = h(psd|(vpbkby))rpbkbv mod(nb)
On the receipt of the third message, B checks whether the
signature of the challenge is correct using the certificate
certu obtained in the first step of the protocol. If the sig-
nature is verified, B establishes an initial reputation rep for
the user, sets the expiration date exp until which the new
pseudonymous of the user will be valid, and it computes the
public information of the signature, i = rep|exp. Then, it
formats the common information as:
τ(i) = 2d + h(i)
So, τ(i) ∈ [2d, 2d+1], and it can be assured that τ(i′) is
not divisible by τ(i) when i′ 6= i. Finally, B computes the
blinded signature doing:
sp = ((np.x)pvkb.τ(i))−1 mod(nb)
The signature sp (signed-pseudonymous) is a mixed-blind
signature because the broker has signed a message np.x
which contains information from both the user and the bro-
ker. Indeed, part of the sp message is hidden with a random
number that only the customer knows, and the signing pri-
vate key includes common information between the customer
and the broker: the reputation and expiration attributes of
the customer.
Figure 2 depicts the steps of the registry process.
Customer: uid
pvku, pbku
Broker: bid
pvkb, pbkb
RegReq,certu
y = xpbkb
ypvku , np = h(psd|(vpbkby))rpbkbv uid
dbU
x, i = (rep, exp), sp = ((np.x)pvkb.τ(i))−1
c = v.x
s = rτ(i).sp
ac = psd, i, c, s
w
Figure 2: Customer Registry
The broker sends the signature sp along with its randomiza-
tion factor x and the reputation and expiration parameters
(rep, exp) to the customer. Since the customer knows her
randomization factor v and the brokers’ x, she can compute
the joint randomization factor c = v.x mod(nb). Then she
removes the blinding factor r from the received sp message
to get the broker’s signature s over her new pseudonymous
psd: s = rτ(i)sp (mod nb).
To ensure that the reputation and expiration values that the
broker has included in the signature are right, and verify
that the signature is correctly bound to her account, the
customer checks if spbkb .(H(psd||cpbkb).c)τ ≡ 1 (mod nb).
The customer stores in her wallet all the account information
(ac) for later use in the reservation phase. The stored data
is: (1) the pseudonymous (psd), (2) the reputation of the
customer (rep), (3) the expiration date of all this account
data (exp), (4) the signature joint randomization factor (c),
and (5) the broker’s signature of the above fields (s). Note
that the broker does not know neither the pseudonymous
of the user nor their joint randomization factor, so the next
time she initiates a session, the broker could neither track
nor profile the habits of the customer.
4.2 Reservation
When a customer wants to reserve a table in a restaurant,
she sends a reservation request (ResReq) message to the
broker. In the message, the user includes the vendor iden-
tifier (vid) of the restaurant she wants to reserve, as well
as the attributes of the reservation (vatt), such as the day,
time, and number of people.
Once the broker receives the ResReq message, it checks
the availability of the vid restaurant to make a reservation
with vatt characteristics and sends back a response message
ResRes to the user with this information. Moreover, if the
response is positive, the broker invites the customer to pro-
ceed with the anonymous reservation by attaching in the
message a randomizing factor y = xpbkb (mod nb).
After receiving ResRes, the customer sends a message iden-
tifying herself with the account information (ac) she stores
in her wallet. She also computes a new pseudonymous psd′
to be used the next time she operates with the broker. User
U blinds the new pseudonymous psd′ using two new random
factors v′ and r′. The resultant blind account information
np is attached in the message ResRes message.
On the receipt of ResRes, the broker first verifies the cus-
tomer has access to the system by:
1. Verifying the signature of the account information ac
is correct (spbkb .(H(psd||cpbkb).c)τ ≡ 1 (mod nb))
2. The expiration date of the account data has not passed
3. The account data is not in the list of already used
logins log
If the account information is valid, the broker stores the ac-
count information in the list of already used logins log. The
log list prevents that customers use a particular ac data
to enter the system several times. The list stores used ac-
counts till they expire. If a user tries to get a session with
an expired account, the broker requests her to register in
the system again and initializes her reputation rep with a
penalization (p.e. 10 points less the normal initialization
rate, which can be set at 0 points). Each time the user has
to register again, the penalization in her initial reputation
is bigger. Brokers can give the users the opportunity to re-
cover some reputation points up to the standard initial level
(0 points) by paying a fee.
When a user makes a reservation request, the broker con-
tacts the solicited restaurant and asks for a reservation with
vatt characteristics and associated to a user with a rep rep-
utation level. If the restaurant agrees, it generates a ran-
dom vcode of 12-bytes and computes rcodeT = h(vcode)
and rcode = rcodeT (mod 264). The restaurant sets a
reservation entry in its database dbV with the tuple (rcode,
rcodeT, vcode), and sends to the broker the values rcode and
rcodeT . The broker also creates a new entry in its reser-
vation database dbR with the data (psd, rcode, rcodeT).
Then, the broker subtracts a unit from the user’s reputa-
tion (provided in the account information ac in the reserva-
tion request message) and signs a message sp that includes
the customer’s next reputation and expiration parameters
(rep′, exp′), as well as a hidden link to her next pseudony-
mous psd′.
Finally, the broker returns to the customer a reservation
response message with information about its randomization
factor x, the user’s reputation and expiration parameters
(rep′, exp′), a blind signature of user’s account information
(sp), and the short reservation code of the service she has
solicited (rcode). rcode is sent to the user in order to present
a reservation identifier in front of the final vendor. To this
end, rcode is short (only 6-bytes), and is sent to the user in
base64 encoding (it occupies 8 characters) so that it is easy
to manage.
After receiving the message, the customer verifies the signa-
ture and stores in her wallet the information of her account
and her reservation.
Figure 3 summarises the steps required to make a reserva-
tion.
Customer: uid
pvku, pbku
Broker: bid
pvkb, pbkb
Vendor: vid
pvkv , pbkv
ac
w
ResReq, vid, vatt
ResRes, y
ac, np
psd(tj)
log
vatt, rep
rcode, rcodeT, vcode
dbV
rcode, rcodeT
psd(tj), vid, rcode, rcodeT
dbR
x, i′, sp, rcode
res = psd(tj), rcode
ac = psd′, i′, c′, s′
w
Figure 3: Reservation
4.3 Cancellation
In case the customer wants to cancel a reservation she sends
a cancellation request CanReq to the broker. The CanReq
contains information of the reservation to cancel (res).
On the receipt of a CanReq message, the broker verifies if
the vendor’s policies allow the cancellation. B responds to
the user whether she can proceed with the cancellation and
it includes in the replying CanRes message a randomizing
factor y = xpbkb (mod nb).
After receiving CanRes, the customer identifies herself with
her account information (ac) and the blind account infor-
mation np to be used in the next session.
When the broker receives CanRes, it verifies the customer
has access to the system in the same way as in the reser-
vation phase (see subsection 4.2), and stores the account
information in the list of already used logins log. Then,
the broker checks the reservation information (res) is cor-
rect and, if the cancellation policies allow it, it deletes the
reservation and sends the cancellation to the vendor. The
broker also increases the reputation of the customer in one
unit, and signs a message sp to the customer that includes
the customer’s next reputation and expiration parameters
(rep, exp), as well as a hidden link to her next pseudony-
mous np.
At last, the broker returns to the customer a cancellation
response message with information about her reputation and
expiration parameters (rep, exp), and a blind signature of
her account information (sp). The broker also informs the
vendor of the reserve cancellation by sending it a message.
After receiving the message, the customer verifies the signa-
ture and stores in her wallet the information of her account.
Figure 4 summarises the steps required to cancel a reserva-
tion.
Customer: uid
pvku, pbku
Broker: bid
pvkb, pbkb
Vendor: vid
pvkv , pbkv
res
w
CanReq, res
rcode, vid
dbR
CanRes, y
ac
w
ac, np
psd(tk)
log
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
psd(tj), vid, rcode, rcodeT
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rcode
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rcode, rcodeT, vcode
dbV
x, i′, sp
ac = psd′, i′, c′, s′
w
Figure 4: Cancel Reservation
4.4 Service
When the customer wants to get the service she has reserved,
she goes the vendor and shows the rcode value (which is
part of the res record she had stored in her wallet in the
reservation phase, part 4.2).
The vendor verifies that there is actually a reservation with
code rcode and if it is, it responds to the user with the val-
idation code vcode. Users will only be able to demonstrate
to the broker that they have fulfilled a reservation if they
provide the vcode linked to a reservation rcode, since vcode
satisfies that rcode = h(vcode) (mod 264). The vendor gives
the vcode to the user either automatically (i.e. through a
Bluetooth push connection) or manually printed in a ticket.
vcode is represented in base64 so that it can be printed with-
out problems. Its printed length is 16 characters, which is
short enough to be managed by hand. Once the user has
received the vcode of the vendor, she can verify that it is
correctly performing the hash operation over it. Note that
if the user holds a smart phone, all the operations of the
protocol can be easily and automatically executed by the
mobile itself which has the computational resources to do it
[21, 22].
The reason for rcode to be so short is twofold: in one hand
it is easy to manage by the users that may have to handle
with this code manually. On the other hand it prevents brute
force attacks by the customers that try to get the associated
vcode of a reservation to earn good reputation in the broker
system without having achieved their responsibilities with
the final vendor. Each rcode can be derived from an average
of 248 vcodes, and for a customer it is impossible to know
which one of them is the real one. So the probability of
lunching a brute force attack and succeed, is lower than
10(−14).
4.5 Deposit
When a customer that had a reservation completes the ac-
tion she had reserved (i.e. going out for a dinner in a restau-
rant), she contacts the broker to update her reputation (see
Figure 5 for a summary of the required steps).
The customer triggers the deposit protocol sending aDepReq
to the broker. The DepReq contains information of the
reservation that has been completed (res).
On the receipt of a DepReq message, the broker verifies that
it has the reservation code in its database dbR. B responds
to the user whether she can proceed with the deposit and
it includes in the replying DepRes message a randomizing
factor y = xpbkb (mod nb).
After receiving DepRes, the customer sends a message iden-
tifying herself with her account information (ac) and pro-
viding blind account information np to be used in the next
session. The customer also sends the validation code vcode
she received when she visited the reserved restaurant, and
some optional feedback (rnote) about the service obtained
by the vendor. Only the validated customers of a restau-
rant can express their opinions of its services and enrich the
reviews analysis managed by the web portal.
When the broker receives DepRes, it verifies the customer
has access to the system and stores the account information
in the list of already used logins log. Then, it checks if the
provided vcode is valid doing rcodeT ≡ h(vcode). If the code
is valid, it deletes the reservation from its database dbR, in-
creases the reputation of the customer, and signs a message
sp to the customer that includes the customer’s next rep-
utation and expiration parameters (rep, exp), as well as a
hidden link to her next pseudonymous np.
Brokers spur customers to send review reports of their ex-
perience in the reserved service by prizing them with good
reputation. Thus, when a costumer makes a deposit after
visiting a restaurant, she recovers the reputation point she
lost in the reservation process. If she moreover provides
some feedback about the vendor, she receives one extra rep-
utation point.
After receiving the sp message, the customer verifies the
signature and stores in her wallet the information of her
account.
4.6 Pseudonymous Renewal
The customer renews her pseudonymous each time she ex-
ecutes an operation with the broker. Yet, the pseudony-
mous has an expiration date, and if a customer do not use
the broker’s services during a long time, she could get her
pseudonymous expired. Therefore, the AMNESIC system
defines a renewal operation which only purpose is to reno-
vate the pseudonymous of that users that do not enter in
the system regularly.
The client application of the user must have a timeout that
automatically initiates a pseudonymous renewal process when
the user has not updated her account information during a
long period. The renewal action is initiated by a RenReq
message. On the receipt of a RenReq message, the broker
sends back a RenRes message with a randomizing factor
y = xpbkb (mod nb). After receiving RenRes, the customer
identifies herself with her account information (ac) and the
blind account information np to be used in the next session.
The broker verifies the customer holds a valid pseudonymous
and stores her account information in the list of already used
logins log. Then, B signs a message sp to the customer that
includes the reputation parameter rep she had before, and
that carries a hidden link to the user’s next pseudonymous
np. After receiving the message, the customer verifies the
signature and stores in her wallet the information of her
account.
Figure 6 summarises the steps of a pseudonymous renewal
process.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section we evaluate the system by the security and
anonymous properties announced in section 3.
1. The customer identity and profile are unknown
Users give personal information (name, public key) to the
web portal when they register to it, but this happens only
once. Then, in the subsequent processes involved in a reser-
vation, the broker controls the access of the users in the
system using a signed authorization message that contains:
Customer: uid
pvku, pbku
Broker: bid
pvkb, pbkb
res
w
DepReq, res
rcode, vid
dbR
DepRes, y
ac
w
ac, vcode, rnote, np
psd(tj)
log
rcodeT ≡ h(vcode)
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
psd(tk), vid, rcode, rcodeT
dbR
x, i′, sp
ac = psd′, i′, c′, s′
w
Figure 5: Coupon Validation
Customer: uid
pvku, pbku
Broker: bid
pvkb, pbkb
RenReq
RenRes, y
ac
w
ac, np
psd(t)
log
x, i′, sp
ac = psd′, i′, c′, s′
w
Figure 6: Pseudonymous renewal
(1) a random one-time pseudonymous, (2) the user’s repu-
tation, (3) an expiration date. All three parameters can be
authenticated because they are generated using the RSA-
partially blind signature scheme proposed by Cao et al. [9],
which has been proved to satisfy the blindness and unforge-
ability properties, even in front of chosen plain text attacks.
The pseudonymous can not be used to track the users since
it is generated using the blind information of the signature
and so, the broker have only access to them once. How-
ever, the user’s reputation and expiration date are part of
the common information of the signature. Nevertheless we
state that these parameters cannot be used to track cus-
tomers since they are very generic (we set the expiration
dates to have a big granularity, i.e. weeks) and shared be-
tween a great proportion of other customers. Besides, we
assume the connections of the users to the web portal can
not be tracked using low layer techniques (cookies are dis-
abled, the IP changes dynamically, ..).
2. Only the customer can make a reservation using her own
reputation
The reputation of a customer is stored by the customer her-
self in her signed authorization message. The authorization
ticket is sent to the broker using an SSL protected channel,
so nobody can steal its information.
3. Only the customer specified in the reservation can receive
the service she has reserved
When a user reserves a table in a restaurant, she gets a
unique reservation code. The reservation code is known by
the vendor, the broker, and the customer herself, but not by
other users of the system. The transmission of the reserva-
tion code is done through SSL protected channels and so, it
can not be recovered by any malicious user.
4. Only the proper customer can recover the funds she has
deposited to make a reservation
To recover the funds of a reservation the customer has to
present to the broker two items:
• the validation code (vcode) associated to the reserva-
tion. vcode is only know by the restaurant, and is given
to the user by hand when she goes to the restaurant
in fulfilment of her reservation.
• the pseudonymous (psd) that was used to get the reser-
vation. The pseudonymous is only known by the user
and the broker
The only person that knows both the vcode and the psd of
the reservation is the user when she has completed the ser-
vice she had reserved.
5. The customer can be certain of being correctly credited
for the reservations and deals with the vendors
Users can always validate if the web portal is managing their
reputation in the expected way. The reservation points of a
customer are part of her signed authorization tokens. These
tokens are generated by the broker, but can be verified by
anyone. Thus, a customer can verify the amount of points
in her account each time she gets an authorization message.
Irregular reputation updates will be immediately detected
by the users.
6. The broker can detect a fraudulent use of a customer’s
deposit
The broker checks that a customer can not use a pseudony-
mous (and its associated reputation) more than once. When
a user identifies herself using a pseudonymous, the broker
stores this identifier in a database until the identifier ex-
pires. During the lifetime of the identifier, for each access
request in the system, the broker will check that the given
pseudonymous has not been used before.
7. The vendor cannot deny that a customer has completed
the deal agreed in a reservation
The only way that a customer can know the vcode associated
with a reservation, is because the vendor has given this to
her.
The function h is collision resistant, which means that it is
computationally infeasible to find two inputs x′ 6= x which
are mapped to the same value y = h(x) = h(x′). There
are a number of practical cryptographic functions that are
assume to be collision resistant, e.g. SHA.256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512 [14]. Their collision resistance strengths are half
the lengths of their hash value.
The reservation and validation codes (rcode and vcode) used
in AMNESIC are quite short due to the limitation of being
able to deal with them without using automatic processes
but transcripts. In particular, the reservation codes are the
result of hashing a 12-byte vcode string. In this case, the
collision resistance offered by the hash function is half the
length of the input, resulting in a strength of 48 bits. A se-
curity strength of 48 bits is below the general NIST recom-
mendations, since a brute force attack to the hash function
would be able to succeed. Thus, to increase the security of
the system, AMNESIC proposes that the reservation code
that is sent to the customer rcode is not the output of the
hash function but a truncated version of it. In this way, a
malicious customer does not have any computational way to
find out vcode from rcode.
If a customer presents a valid vcode in the broker (i.e. rcodeT =
h(vcode)), it means that she has received this code from the
vendor, and the vendor cannot deny that the reservation has
been fulfilled.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have described the AMNESIC system for
anonymous on-line reservations. A key concept in AM-
NESIC is the provision of user privacy protection both in
front of brokers and final vendors. Moreover the system is
easy to deploy and do not require great investments from the
vendors or the customers. We have specified the protocols
of the processes involved in a reservation service and have
analysed their security and robustness.
The reservation service has been applied in the context of a
web portal that promotes restaurants and permits making
reservations. Clients benefit from the anonymous reserva-
tion system in the sense that neither the broker nor the
restaurant knows who they are (eventually the restaurant
will know their faces, but not their identity). The broker
cannot gather information about how often a certain user
goes to a restaurant, with how many people, or which type
of food he enjoys. On the other hand, the system spurs users
to give feedback about the restaurants they visited, so the
broker benefits of having updated reports of the quality of
the restaurants to make a thorough and valuable review of
them. Finally, restaurants benefit from the system because
clients are more honest in their reservations, otherwise they
are penalized.
Our further work focuses on extending the AMNESIC con-
cepts to a multi-device context, i.e., each user can connect
to the broker using different terminals (private or public).
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